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Abstract
The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions
trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005) to ini-
tial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-rm relative performance com-
parisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms).
We show that using rmshistorical output for allocating permits is never opti-
mal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using rmshistorical emissions
is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of alloca-
tion mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating
permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and
emissions. We then outline su¢ cient conditions for a socially optimal relative
performance mechanism.
Keywords: relative performance, initial allocation, pollution permits, auctions,
rank-order contests.
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1 Introduction
Tradable permit markets have become an important policy tool in the control of pol-
lution. Schemes such as RECLAIM and the SO2 market in the U.S. have shown that
tradable permits are a viable and cost e¤ective market-based mechanism (e.g. Stavins,
1998; Schmalensee et al., 1998). Yet there is still an active debate about how to allo-
cate permit endowments among the participating rms at the beginning of each trading
period. As Böhringer and Lange (2005) argue, some initial allocation mechanisms may
create inter-temporal distortions and result in socially suboptimal outcomes.
In this paper, we extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005) to accommodate
most of the existing dynamic initial allocation mechanisms (including grandfathering
and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using rmshistorical outputs
for allocating permits is never optimal, while using rmshistorical emissions is optimal
only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms.
Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on
an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We outline su¢ cient
conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism and discuss the issues
related to the choice of a suitable mechanism for initial allocation.
In our analysis, we discuss two types of mechanisms that are commonly considered
for allocating initial endowments of permits. The rst mechanism, which we call an
Absolute Performance Mechanism (APM), involves permit allocations based on the
levels of individual rm activity. The second mechanism, which we call a Relative
Performance Mechanism (RPM), involves permit allocations based on how the levels
of a rms activity compare to the levels of other rms activities, or on inter-rm
relative comparisons. The distinction between these two mechanisms is crucial as rms
behaviour in the permit market is subject to whether rmsbelieve they are obtaining
permits individually or, as under a RPM, as part of a game where a rms allocation
is dependent on other rmsactions. We show in this paper that a mechanism that
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allocates permits based on rmsabsolute performance (APM), as used by Böhringer
and Lange (2005), is a special case of a generalized relative performance mechanism
(RPM), and thus that the two mechanisms share a number of optimality properties in
a dynamic setting. We however argue that mechanisms which are based on relative
performance might be superior over those based on absolute performance and o¤er a
promising alternative to auctioning and grandfathering, namely a rank-order contest.
Both types of mechanisms have had important applications in existing tradable
permit markets. Absolute performance mechanisms have been advocated in the form of
relative emissions or intensity-based emissions caps (Fischer 2001; Ellerman and Wing,
2003; Fischer, 2003; Kuik and Mulder, 2004; Pizer, 2005; Newell and Pizer, 2006).1 In
such a scheme intra-rm relative comparisons exist, where the performance of a given
rm is evaluated relative to its own activity, but not relative to the activity of other
rms. Rather than having a cap on absolute levels of emissions, an intensity-based cap
involves a ceiling on the emissions intensity (i.e. emissions per one unit of output). This
type of approach is becoming increasingly common, for example, Bode (2005) notes that
a number of participants in the UK emissions trading scheme were given an intensity
target. Furthermore, the Bush administration in the U.S. has strongly advocated this
type of approach to tackle climate change (Kolstad, 2005; Pizer, 2005). When a trading
system is based on emissions intensity, each rm can unilaterally increase both their
output and emissions without changing emissions intensity and without any e¤ect on
other rms (the permit allocation is an adjustable grandfathering mechanism).
However, the majority of distribution rules which have been discussed are relative
performance mechanisms. The two most common RPMs include auctions (where rms
are allocated permits based on their relative bids) and grandfathering with a xed
cap (where rmsare allocated permits based on their relative emissions levels with
respect to some xed cap) (see Hahn and Noll, 1982; Lyon, 1984; 1986; Oehmke, 1987;
Milliman and Prince, 1989; Van Dyke, 1991; Franciosi et al., 1993; Parry, 1995; Parry
et al., 1999; Cramton and Kerr, 2002). However, there is a large selection of RPMs
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that have not been extensively considered in the literature. For example, yardstick
competition, where each rms performance is assessed relatively to the performance
of other rms has been suggested (Shleifer, 1985; Franckx et al., 2005; Nalebu¤ and
Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b). Moreover, a novel RPM that could be envisaged to allocate
permits is the use of contests or tournaments where rms spend resources in order to
wina proportion of the permit allocation (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; 2006).
Inter-rm comparisons using relative performance mechanisms have a number of
general regulatory advantages which have been widely documented in the literature
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holmström, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebu¤ and
Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b; Mookherjee, 1984; Shleifer, 1985; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001;
2006). Relative performance mechanisms can also be advantageous in an environmental
context. Govindasamy et al. (1994) suggested the use of a tournament to control non-
point pollution, and found that a RPM results in a number of desirable outcomes.
Franckx et al. (2005) extended the work of Govindasamy et al. (1994) by using a
di¤erent RPM, yardstick competition, and conducted the analysis in a more general
environmental regulatory setting. They nd that this RPM will be desirable when a
large number of rms participate and common shocks (such as similar technology shocks
or oil price changes) are experienced by all rms.
Rather fewer authors have focused on relative performance issues in emissions trad-
ing. Using a rent-seeking model, Malueg and Yates (2006) examine the e¤ects of citizen
participation in a permit market to determine the endowment and price of permits.
They nd that citizenschoice of lobbying and permit purchases in a market depends on
the initial allocation mechanism chosen (auctioning or grandfathering). Finally, Groe-
nenberg and Blok (2002) outline an initial allocation mechanism for a permit market
that bases distribution on benchmarking the production process of each rm and nd it
eliminates a large amount of problems associated with existing allocation mechanisms.
For a number of decades the free allocation (grandfathering) of permits has been dis-
cussed as a feasible method of allocation (e.g. Tietenberg, 1985). Indeed, the majority
4
of actual emissions trading schemes to date use grandfathering as the primary allocation
mechanism due to its political viability: market participants will always lobby for the
free allocation of permits (Stavins 1998). Grandfathering might also be seen as o¤ering
a closer t to existing regulatory approaches, since it does not involve any fundamental
change in property rights compared with, for instance, a system of performance stan-
dards for polluting emissions. Grandfathering might also be preferred by governments
on competition grounds, since the avoidance of a lump-sum distribution from industry
to government can avoid disadvantaging domestic rms relative to their international
competitors. On the negative side, grandfathering could be seen as rewarding rms who
have engaged in relatively low pollution control e¤orts in the past. As grandfathering is
a commonly used tool, the discussions regarding the e¤ects of the mechanism have been
widespread. In particular, Requate and Unold (2003) have shown that substantial inno-
vation incentives exist for rms in a grandfathered emissions scheme. However, Goulder
et al. (1997) found grandfathering to be a rather ine¢ cient allocation mechanism com-
pared to alternative allocation procedures. Recently, grandfathering has been adapted
to include a dynamic element (Bode, 2006; Böhringer and Lange, 2005). In particular,
Böhringer and Lange (2005) have discussed updated grandfathering which continually
updates the free allocation of permits based on historical emissions and output.2 They
found that the dynamic allocation has to be carefully considered to reduce distortions
in the product and permit market.
Another important aspect of the mechanisms in question involves multi-period choice
problems in pollution permit markets. Several studies have focused on general design
considerations for multi-period permit markets (Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Rubin,
1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997; Schennach, 2000; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Yates and
Cronshaw, 2001), yet only a few studies have focused on the initial allocation of permits
in this setting. In the context of the electricity sector, Bode (2006) nds considerable
variation in the distributional impacts among di¤erent allocation mechanisms within a
dynamic emissions trading scheme. Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) model a number of
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allocation mechanisms in a dynamic setting and nd that welfare and employment vary
drastically across allocation mechanisms.
The work which is the most relevant to our paper is by Böhringer and Lange (2005),
who compare the e¢ ciency of dynamic permit allocations based on output, emissions
and a lump-sum transfer. In comparing e¢ ciency, they make a distinction between
markets that are open (i.e. when rms can trade outside the domestic market) and
closed (i.e. when participating rms cannot trade in permits outside the domestic
market). This distinction is important to policy analysis as tradable permit markets
are becoming increasingly varied in size and scope and have the potential to have
either an open or closed market structure. They nd in a closed market it is optimal
to allocate permits on criteria not related to output, whereas for an open market, an
e¢ cient allocation occurs when the permits are distributed using a lump-sum approach.
However, in their treatment of the initial allocation mechanism, Böhringer and Lange
(2005) assume that the permit distribution to a rm is based only on rmsabsolute
levels of output and emissions, so that other rmss actions do not a¤ect the allocation
of a given rm. Yet, given the xed emission cap considered by Böhringer and Lange
(2005), the permit allocation to a rm is also crucially dependent on the behaviour
of rival rms. This is because a xed emissions cap implies that if in the current
period rival rms, say, increase their output and emissions relative to a given rm,
then the current-period aggregate output and emissions increase, thus decreasing the
proportion of future permits that each rm can receive per each unit of current output
and emissions. As the result, even if a given rm does not alter its own choices, its
own future allocation of permits will change. Thus we argue that the initial allocation
process considered by Böhringer and Lange (2005) should take into account other rms
actions and thus should be modelled as a relative performance mechanism.
Our paper therefore attempts to extend Böhringer and Lange (2005) by implement-
ing a more general design of a dynamic initial allocation mechanism, which allows for
the allocation of permits to be based on each rms choices relative to other rms. Fol-
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lowing Böhringer and Lange (2005), we consider allocation mechanisms which are based
on choices of output and emissions, but in addition we consider possible permit alloca-
tions based on an externalfactor which is independent of output and emissions. This
allows us to create an encompassing model for most existing types of initial allocation
mechanisms such as grandfathering, auctioning and contests. We show that a RPM can
e¢ ciently (socially optimally) allocate pollution permits if the criteria used to compare
rms is based on such an external factor, in a contest. Given the variety of potential
external factors, we suggest a number of criteria that a regulator may take into account
when choosing a suitable factor. We also argue in favour of a new mechanism, which
involves an inter-rm contest designed to achieve two goals simultaneously - that is,
the primary goal of e¢ ciency and some secondary goal, such as generating revenue,
achieving health and safety targets, noise reduction, reduction of other pollutants, etc.
Given the political economy problems with both auctions and grandfathering as a way
of initially allocating permits, this new mechanism may well be of interest to policy
makers.
Our contribution is thus two-fold. First, we extend the results of Böhringer and
Lange (2005) to a wider class of mechanisms, so-called relative performance mecha-
nisms, such as grandfathering with xed cap, yardsticks, auctions, contests, etc. Al-
though such mechanisms create a situation where rmschoices are interdependent, the
general intuition of Böhringer and Lange (2005) holds in the Nash equilibrium of the
ensuing game. That is, for a wide range of mechanisms, for the initial allocation to be
cost-e¢ cient, it should not depend on rmsoutputs, and may depend on rmsemis-
sions only in limited circumstances. Second, we propose that the lump-sum distribution
advocated by Böhringer and Lange (2005) can be implemented better a relative perfor-
mance mechanism based on an external factor. Such a cost-e¢ cient mechanism allows
the regulator to achieve a secondary target, such as raising revenue, - thus killing two
birds with one stone.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to introduce a generalised RPM
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into a permit market which allows us to model most existing relative-based mechanisms
and has the added advantage of encompassing APMs. The paper is organised as follows:
section 2 outlines our model and presents the social optimality conditions and rms
optimisation problem. A socially optimal dynamic initial allocation mechanism, when
the market experiences both exogenous and endogenous permit prices, is considered in
section 3. Section 4 discusses the external factor, while section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We follow Böhringer and Lange (2005) and consider a multi-period partial equilibrium
model. The technology of a rm i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) at time t (t = 1; 2; : : :) is given by a
cost function cit(eit; qit), where qit is the rms output level, and eit the rms emissions
resulting from production. Costs cit are assumed to be twice di¤erentiable and convex,
with @cit
@eit
 0,@cit
@qit
> 0, @
2cit
@e2it
, @
2cit
@q2it
;  @2cit
@eit@qit
 0 and @2cit
@q2it
 @2cit
@e2it
 

@2cit
@eit@qit
2
> 0.
The rm sells its output in a competitive product market at a price of pt. Finally,
the rm is regulated by a competitive emissions-trading program and receives an initial
allocation of permits Ait.
We further assume that each rm i also produces a factor zit which has no di-
rect relevance in the product and emissions market, and thus is outside the regulators
interests and/or jurisdiction. This external factor is producedby each rm inde-
pendently of output and emissions at a cost vit(zit) (possibly zero), with dvitdzit  0. While
this external factor is irrelevant to the product and emissions market, it may determine
rmspermit allocations Ait in a manner to be specied later.
2.1 The Generalised Allocation Mechanism
Böhringer and Lange (2005) considered a mechanism whereby pollution permits are
allocated based on the levels of rms historical production qit and emissions eit.3 We
rst extend this mechanism by assuming that in addition to output and emissions, some
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externalfactor may play a role in how many permits will be allocated to a given rm,
but this factor has no relevance to the product and emissions market, and thus is beyond
the interest or jurisdiction of the regulator (and it is this factor which determines the
lump-sum allocations in the model of Böhringer and Lange, 2005).
Examples of a possible external factor include population size in a rms locality,
a rms socially responsible activities, a rms emissions of other pollutants, a random
event such a lottery draw and so on. We denote such external factors as zit. While we
will discuss the external factor more in section 4, it is worth noting here that the nature
of the external factor determines both the cost of this factor to the rm, as well as the
degree of rms control over this factor. For example, population size is both beyond
the rms control and it is free to the rm. On the other hand, lottery tickets can
be bought by rms, or can be allocated to rms by the regulator (and thus are beyond
rmscontrol). In contrast, in a permit auction, both success and costs of each rms
bid depends on the bids of other participating rms.
Thus, the allocation mechanism based on absolute performance (APM) is given by
AAPMit = 
t 1
q;it
~h(qi(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it ~g(ei(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it
~f(zi(t 1)) (1)
where ~h; ~g; ~f are increasing and continuously di¤erentiable functions, and t 1q;it , 
t 1
e;it ,
t 1z;it  0 are the weights (in period t) placed on period t   1s performance. The
weights reect the relative importance of a particular activity, and can vary across time
periods and across rms.
We extend equation (1) by allowing for rmsperformance to be evaluated in com-
parison to other rms, i.e. how a given rm is performance at time t in production
qit, emissions eit, an external factor zit compares relatively to the performance of every
other rm  i = f1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; ng. Formally, rm is performance at time t in
output relatively to other rmsoutput q it is given by a relative performance function
h = h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)). Similarly, relative performance in emissions and external factor
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are given by g = g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)), and f = f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)), respectively. We assume
hi =
@h
@qit
, gi =
@g
@eit
, fi =
@f
@zit
> 0 so that, for given levels of other rmsperformance,
higher levels of emissions, output, and the external factor result in a larger permit allo-
cation. We also assume that h i = @h@q it , g i =
@g
@e it
, f i =
@f
@z it
 0, so that for a given
level of rms performance, its allocation does not increases if other rmsincrease their
levels of emissions, output, or the external factor.4
We take a rather general view of the relative allocation functions. That is, to allow
for uncertainty over allocations, we treat these functions as expectations over possi-
ble realisations. Thus allocations can be distributed using deterministic rules (such as
yardstick competitions) devised by the regulator, as well as by lotteries, auctions, or
contests. For analytical tractability, we assume that the relative allocation functions
h; g; f are continuously di¤erentiable.5 For example, a rms relative allocation can
be determined continuously based on how its own output compares to aggregate out-
put, e.g. h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = 
qit
qit+
P
 i q it
. Another example of a continuous relative
allocation function includes Tullock-type (winner takes all) contest allocations, where
a rms expected amount of permits is given by all participating rmsoutputs as fol-
lows: h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = 
qrit
qrit+
P
 i q
r
 it
- i.e. the size of the permit lot  multiplied by
the probability of winning the contest (see Skaperdas, 1996).
Thus, the permit allocation for rm i at time t, according to the generalized Relative
Performance Mechanism is
ARPMit = 
t 1
q;ith(qi(t 1);q i(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)) (2)
Comparing this relative performance allocation mechanism to that based on absolute
performance (1), one can observe the following:
Remark 1 If h i  g i  f i  0 then a relative performance allocation mechanism
reduces to an absolute performance allocation mechanism.
In other words, the absolute performance mechanism considered by Böhringer and
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Lange (2005) is a special case of relative performance mechanism when rm is allocation
is independent of the remaining rmsactions. In this case, the remaining rmsactions
have no impact on rm is allocation, and a rm i can obtain permits by optimally
choosing qit, eit and zit, without considering other rmsactions.
Note that Böhringer and Lange (2005) implicitly assume that the grandfathering
mechanism is an absolute performance mechanism. However, with a xed emission cap,
for a given behaviour of other rms, if a particular rm increases/decreases its output
and/or emissions, that would a¤ect the aggregate output and emissions of domestic
rms, ultimately a¤ecting how many permits both that rm and all other rms will
receive. Thus, it is implicit in Böhringer and Lange (2005) that the factor weights will
change each period to reect changes in the aggregate activities. To see this, suppose
that at time t a xed amount of permits Et is allocated among n rms proportionally
to each rms output qit. In other words, each rm i receives an allocation tqit, where
t =
Et
qit+
P
 i q it
. Thus, the output weight t has to be adjusted each period to reect
changes in aggregate production. It is easy to see that such a xed cap grandfathering
mechanism is a RPM with h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = Et
qit
qit+
P
 i q it
.
When a relative performance mechanism is used, rm is choices a¤ect the number
of permits allocated to rm j 6= i, and thus a¤ect rm js prots, and vice versa. In
other words, a RPM creates a situation where rms choices are interdependent. In such
a situation, a rational rm will make its choices strategically, by taking into account
the anticipated actions of its rivals. The relative performance permit allocation mech-
anism thus results in a game among participating rms, which leads rmsbehaviour
to be typically di¤erent from their behaviour when faced with an APM. To explore the
distortionary e¤ect of such behaviour, we rst need to consider the socially optimal
situation.
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2.2 The Socially Optimal Outcome
We now consider the regulators point of view. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005) we
assume that the regulator cares about prots and costs associated with the production
of output and emissions of the specic pollutant, as well as the trade in the pollution
permits, but is not interested in the external factors such as population size, lottery
draws, or auction bids (we will come back to this assumption in Section 4). Thus,
the regulators objective is to maximise (minimise) the aggregate prot (cost) that all
the domestic rms incur while producing the product of the regulators interests or
jurisdiction whilst being constrained by the emissions program.
When trade in emissions permits is not restricted to the regulators jurisdiction,
rms can import/export emissions across the systems borders. From a regulators
point of view, this is a (small) open emissions trading system, where the permit price is
exogenously determined, and the aggregate emissions in the jurisdiction are not capped.
This may occur when the market is open to transactions from other (possibly larger)
schemes. For example, in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS),
member states allocate permits domestically, but rms in each member state can trade
permits with rms in other member states.
In such a system, the regulators objective takes into account the balance of the
trade in the emission permits. Thus, given the set of prices (t; pit), the regulators
objective is to
Max
qit;eit
X
t
"
nX
i=1
pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  t
 
nX
i=1
eit   Et
!#
(3)
where t is the exogenous permit price determined by the (international) demand and
supply of permits in the open market and Et is the domestic emissions cap at time t.
For each rm i and each of its rival  i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i+1; : : : ; ng, the socially optimal
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conditions are as follows:6
pit =
@cit
@qit
(4)
 @cit
@eit
=  @cjt
@ejt
(= t) (5)
for all i; j 6= i; t. That is, at period t all rms will simultaneously equate their marginal
production costs to their rm-specic product price (4). Also, in the equilibrium, rms
marginal abatement costs will be equalized (5), and will be equal to the (exogenously
determined) common permit price.
In contrast, in a closed emissions trading system, a single regulator distributes the
total supply of permits, and thus ensures that the aggregate emissions are capped:P
i eit = Et. The emissions permit price is endogenously determined by the (domestic)
demand and supply in the closed market. The regulators objective function is thus:
Max
qit;eit
X
t
"
nX
i=1
pitqit   cit(eit; qit)
#
subject to
nX
i=1
eit = Et (6)
The socially optimal conditions are identical to the conditions (4-5), except that rms
marginal abatement costs will be equal to the shadow price of abatement.
2.3 Firm Optimisation
We rst extended the allocation model of Böhringer and Lange (2005) by allowing for
evaluations based on an independent external factor such as population size, socially
responsible activities, emissions of other pollutants, lottery draw, and so on. We now
focus our attention on the rm-specic problem. Given the prole of other rmsactions,
the set of prices (t; pit), and its permit allocation Ait for the target pollutant, a rm i
will choose a level of emissions, output and an external factor, (qit;, e

it;, z

it) to maximise
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its total stream of prots:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t=1
[pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  vit(zit)]  t(eit   Ait)
Thus, when a relative performance mechanism (2) is used to allocate pollution permits,
rm is objective function is:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t=1
([pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  vit(zit)]  teit
+t[
t 1
q;ith(qi(t 1);q i(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1))]]

For each rm i and its rivals  i = f1; : : : ; i   1; i + 1; : : : ; ng, the optimal choices are
determined by the rst order conditions as follows:
pit + t+1
t
q;i(t+1)hi(qit;q it) =
@c
@qit
(7)
t   t+1te;i(t+1)gi(eit;e it) =  
@c
@eit
(8)
t+1
t
z;i(t+1)fi(zit;z it) =
dv
dzit
(9)
Similarly to the absolute performance allocation mechanism of Böhringer and Lange
(2005), when a rms current output and emissions determine its future allocation of
permits (and thus its prots), each rm will take this intertemporal e¤ect into account.7
Thus, relative to the socially optimal conditions (4) and (5), a mechanism which uses
past performance in output and emissions will generate an intertemporal distortion of
rmsincentives.
Importantly, this holds both for the absolute performance mechanism (1) but also
for the relative performance mechanism (2). To see that, compare equations (7) to (4),
as well as (8) to (5). Given that gi and hi are both positive, such a mechanism creates an
implicit incentive to increase production and emissions beyond socially optimal levels.8
Because the external factor z is outside the interests or jurisdiction of the social planner,
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it does not distort incentives when either a relative or absolute performance mechanism
is used (9). For a given prole of other rmsactions, rm i chooses external factor
zit, optimally, so that the marginal cost of obtaining the factor equals the marginal
future benet obtained from the permit allocation. In summary, we have the following
generalization of the intuition of Böhringer and Lange (2005):
Remark 2 When rmspermit allocations are at least partially determined by output
and emissions, all permit allocation mechanisms of the general form (2) create distor-
tionary incentives in the product and permit markets.
As we noted above, the absolute performance mechanism (1) is a special case of the
relative performance mechanism (2). Thus, any mechanism that allocates permits based
on historical output and/or emissions will distort rms incentives to produce output
and emissions optimally. Not only would the distortions occur when the adjustable
cap grandfathering scheme (which is an APM) is used, but also any other scheme
which utilizes rmsrelative performance with respect to each other in output and/or
emissions.
This problem, of increased output and emissions, is associated with the ratchet
e¤ect- using current performance to determine future targets and future initial allo-
cations (Weitzman, 1980; Freixas et al., 1985; Bergland et al., 2002). If a rm decided
not to increase emissions (output) then their permit allocation would be ratcheted
down, as their emissions (output) would be relatively lower than all other rms. If such
a system was implemented, rms that actively lowered emissions (output) would be im-
plicitly punished. Therefore, each rm has an incentive to increase its relative emissions
(output) to stop their future permit allocation from being lowered. Thus, both RPMs
and APMs will create distortions in the output and permits market when the criteria
used to allocate permits is based on historical output and/or emissions information.
However, RPMs possess an additional important feature that APMs do not, namely,
that a RPM results in a game among participating rms. This is because when each
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rm is evaluated relatively to other rms, rmsactions become interdependent. In
the Nash equilibrium of this game, each rm chooses a prole (qit; e

it; z

it) according to
equations (7)-(9) given the equilibrium beliefs about other rmschoices.
3 Socially Optimal Allocation Mechanisms
In the last section we examined the ine¢ ciencies caused by a generalised relative perfor-
mance mechanism where the criteria used to allocate permits were based on historical
output, emissions, and an external factor. In this section we will extend the argument
of Böhringer and Lange (2005) against the use of historical outputs in generalized rela-
tive performance mechanisms. Moreover, when the system is open, so that the permit
price is determined exogenously, the external factor should be the sole determinant of
the rms allocations. When the closed system is used, where the permit price can
endogenously adjust to the aggregate supply of emissions, there is a possibility of using
a linear performance scheme in emissions.
3.1 Open System
Recall that in a (small) open permit trading system, the aggregate supply of permits
is determined jointly by the domestic allocation of permits and by the allocations of
permits to all other foreign participants. Thus, the permit price is determined exoge-
nously. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005), the market equilibrium outcome (8), can
be transformed into the socially optimal outcome (5), by implementing the su¢ cient
condition te;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. Similarly, one can ensure that the individually optimal
production level (7) corresponds to the socially optimal production level (4), by setting
tq;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. This leads us to the following:
Proposition 1 In a (small) open trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be
achieved by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor zit
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only. That is, an optimal mechanism involves setting t 1q;it  t 1e;it  0, for all i; t in the
allocation equation (2):
Ait = 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1); z i(t 1)) (10)
That is, in open trading systems, to achieve the socially optimal outcome, a regulator
should place a zero weight for historical output and emissions, and design a system that
is based solely on rmsperformance in an external factor, which is not related to the
output and emissions choice variables. By restricting allocation to variables that do
not a¤ect the permit and product market, the rms incentives remain undistorted.
This occurs because using an external factor breaks the intertemporal link between the
permit rent (output subsidy) and the incentive to alter the choice variables. Our results
agree with the commonly held view that one can obtain a socially optimal outcome by
distributing permits based on an external factor (Goulder et al., 1997; Cramton and
Kerr, 2002). Because an absolute performance mechanism is a special case of relative
performance mechanism, the above result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer
and Lange (2005, Proposition 2). That is, if the allocation function for each rm i is
independent of rivalsactions, it is socially optimal to use historical external factor to
allocate permits.
3.2 Closed System
We now consider an emissions program where the permit price is endogenously deter-
mined by the demand and supply in a closed permit market. This includes a con-
ventional closed market system where the sole supply of permits originates from one
regulator and where the permit price is determined by the aggregate level of emissions
in the emissions program.
Comparing equations (4) with (7) and equations (5) with (8) one can obtain the
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following socially optimal conditions for output and emissions:
tq;i(t+1)hi(qit;q it) = 0 (11)
te;i(t+1)gi(eit;e it) = 
t
e;j(t+1)gj(ejt;e jt) (12)
8i, j 6= i and  i = f1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; ng.
Similar to the exogenous case, equation (11) suggests that to achieve social opti-
mality, the marginal benet to rm i from increasing output should be equal to zero.
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for achieving social optimum involves the regulator placing
a zero weight on each rms historical output:
tq;i(t+1) = 0 8 i; t (13)
In contrast, equation (12) suggests that the marginal permit allocation should be equal
across rms. This condition is di¢ cult to ensure for all rms and for all functional
forms of g. We could nd only one set of su¢ cient conditions for social optimality in
emissions which holds for all functional forms of g, which is similar to the su¢ cient
conditions for output:
te;i(t+1) = 0 8 i; t (14)
that is, the regulator should put a zero weight on each rms historical emissions choices.
These conditions not only ensure social optimality for any relative (and thus absolute)
performance mechanism, but also requires less problem solving by the regulator and
participating rms.
Instead, if a non-zero weight for historical emissions choices is selected then only
a narrow class of RPMs satisfy the social optimality condition (12). In other words,
only RPMs that create an identical marginal allocation can obtain a socially optimal
outcome. An example of such mechanism is a yardstick mechanism that allocates
permits to each rm based on how its historical emissions compare to the other rms
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average historical emissions e.g. g(eit; e it) = 1te;i(t+1)

Et+1
n
+ t

eit  
P
 i e it
n 1

for all
i and t (as well as its absolutecounterpart g(eit) = tte;i(t+1)
eit). Obviously, equating
emissions weightse;it across rms makes the problem easier.
Thus, any RPM with identical marginal allocations across rms can socially opti-
mally allocate permits based on rmsrelative performances with respect to historical
emissions and an external factor. Our results agree with Böhringer and Lange (2005)
who were able to prove that the optimality result holds for a linear APM. Therefore,
RPMs and APMs that have identical marginal allocations across rms can obtain a
socially optimal outcome.
Thus, it follows from inspection of equations (11) and (12) that:
Proposition 2 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved
by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor zit as well as
using suitably chosen relative performance schemes in historical emissions, and ignoring
rmshistorical outputs, i.e. t 1q;it  0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation equation (2)
becomes:
Ait = 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1); e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1); z i(t 1)) (15)
where functions g are chosen such that condition (12) is satised.
Again, because absolute performance mechanisms are a special case of relative per-
formance mechanism, the above result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer and
Lange (2005, Proposition 1). Importantly, one can achieve social optimality in the
closed system by using the same permit allocation scheme as in the open system:
Corollary 1 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved by
allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor zit only, i.e.
t 1q;it  t 1e;it  0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation equation (2) becomes:
Ait = 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)) (16)
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In other words, regardless of the nature trading system, one can implement the
socially optimal permit allocation mechanism based on the relative performance in the
external factor. Thus, the external factor plays a key role in optimal permit allocation
scheme, calling for further issues to be considered by the allocation mechanism designer.
4 The External Factor
We argued in the previous section that one can achieve social optimality in the product
and target pollutant markets by using rmsrelative performance with respect to an
external factor to allocate target pollution permits. In this section, we will describe
the external factor, possible mechanisms based on relative performance in this external
factor, as well as the benets of this approach.
4.1 Criteria for the Choice of an External Factor
We dene the external factor as anything which has no direct relevance to the product
and target pollutant emissions markets, and which is thus beyond the interest or juris-
diction of the regulator. Examples of possible external factor include population size in
rms locality, rms socially responsible activities, rms emissions of other pollutants,
a random event such a lottery draw, and so on. Since the external factor can take a
variety of forms, the regulator faces a choice of a suitable external factor. However,
there is number of issues involved in the external factor choice.
Independence: To achieve social optimality, the productionof the external
factor has to be independent of rmsoutput and emissions of the target
pollutant. Obviously, if the external factor is correlated with rms output
and/or emissions, rmsincentives will be distorted, and social optimality
will not be achieved.
Ease of use: As the main objective of the regulator is to minimise the
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aggregate cost of the emissions program, a desirable external factor should
be easy for the regulator to observe.
Reward of E¤ort: The regulator may choose the external factor to reward
rmse¤orts. When heterogeneity of rmsis substantial, the external fac-
tor may take a form of intensity, or within-rm relative assessment - for
example, proportion of rms community activities relatively to the size of
locality.
Equal Opportunity: The regulator may wish to ensure that all rms have
equal opportunity to obtain permit allocations, and thus that the external
factor can be produced by every participating rm. When the regulated
rms believe they are being treated fairlyin a sense of equality of oppor-
tunity, then the emissions program may have a higher chance of success.
Political Acceptability of the External Factor: The success of the allocation
scheme may depend on political acceptability of the external factor by the
regulated rms and regulator (as well as possibly by the general public).
Fair Allocations: As psychologists suggest, judgments of allocative fairness
are a¤ected by the relative merits of the recipients, thus suggesting that
relative performance mechanisms may be perceived to be fairas long as
the external factor is considered to be meritorious.9
Double Dividend: Of particular interest may be those external factors where
the marginal benets will typically exceed the marginal social costs. In other
words, the external factor may be chosen so that it confers some additional
benet to the regulator other than the control of emissions. The regulator
could dene a costly zit in such a way as it would prefer to observe higher
(or lower) values.
As the last three of these issues may be of particular interest to mechanism designers,
we will discuss them in detail.
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4.2 A Non-Monetary External Factor
As it was mentioned above, one of the possible reasons why regulators avoid allocating
permits based on rms performance in external monetaryfactor - such as auction bids
- is that it is politically unpopular. We thus suggest that perhaps a mechanism that
is based on relative performance in a non-monetary external factor, may have a better
political acceptability, in particular if they involve a possibility of social betterment.
When a non-monetary external factor is chosen as a basis for permit allocations, there
are no direct nancial transfers. Firms instead are rewarded for the (non-monetary)
actions they choose. This reasoning is very similar to the arguments that advocate a
grandfathering system rather than an auction (Stavins, 1998). However, as we showed
above, grandfathering schemes involving historically updated outputs and emissions are
distortive. Yet we suggest that a regulator can choose a non-monetary external factor
that is agreeable for rms (or at least less controversial than other criteria).
There is a variety of possible non-monetary external factors. Charitable activities
such as support of improvements in education and health infrastructure in the local
community may be viable. This may prove to be a meritorious allocation process; rms
are given the rightto pollute based on the degree of their social responsibilities within
a community. Another set of alternative external factors may be of particular relevance
to environmental regulator. These may include reduction of an external basket of
environmental pollutants or environmental indicators, for example noise pollution, or
investments in energy e¢ ciency. That is, rms could be allocated permits for the target
pollutant based on their reduction of completely separate and independent pollutants.
However, we have to emphasize again that, to achieve social optimality in output
and emissions markets, a potential non-monetary external factor zit has to be indepen-
dent from the rms emissions and output choices. Thus special care has to be taken
in regulators choice of non-target pollutants as external factors as emissions of some
pollutants can be correlated with emissions of the target pollutant, leading to potential
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ine¢ ciencies in target pollutant emissions market.
4.3 The Regulators Secondary Objective
As we mentioned above, there may exist external factors which are irrelevant to the
product and target pollutant emissions market, but nevertheless the regulator may be
interested in rms engaging in production of this external factor. If this is the case, the
regulator may have a primary objective of controlling emissions at lowest social cost, as
well as a secondary objective of increasing the aggregate amount of the external factor,
or its net benets.
One obvious example of multiple regulatory objectives is the double dividend
argument for the use of auctions for permit allocations. As Cramton and Kerr (2002,
p.335) suggest, a permit auction can raise revenue whilst enforcing emissions control.
This revenue can be used to reduce distortionary taxes in the economy (e.g. Parry,
1997) or reduce the burden on auction participants through a revenue neutral auction
(Hahn and Noll, 1982; Hahn, 1988).
Alternatively, there can be two (non-competing) regulators with di¤erent objectives.
For example, the energy (electricity) industry may be required to participate in an emis-
sions program whilst simultaneously being overseen by social/public policy regulator to
promote rmsanti-discriminatory personnel policies. The environmental policy regula-
tor aims to control aggregate emissions at the lowest possible cost and is not concerned
about the size or cost of the external factor in any way. The second regulator is possibly
a social/public policy regulator whos aim is to maximise the aggregate external factor
produced by the participating rms. Another example of a double objective may be
the regulation of two environmental targets, with one target being controlled by target
pollutant permit market, and another target currently being unregulated - for example,
emissions of CO2 and a basket of other greenhouse gases. In any case, the secondary
objective involves maximization of rmsaggregate activities, expenditures, or e¤orts
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(for a similar objective see for example Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).
As we argued above, one can achieve the socially optimal outcome in product and
target pollutant markets by allocating permits using an external factor only. Therefore,
using such an approach simultaneously achieves the primary target of socially optimal
outcome in the two markets and a secondary target of maximisation of the aggregate
external factor. Formally, let 2 (0; 1] represent the relative importance of the primary
target (emissions control), and let us consider (small) open system (the argument for the
closed system will be only slightly di¤erent). In this case, the combinedregulatory
objective is:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t
nX
i=1
[(pitqit   cit(eit; qit))  (1 )zit] subject to
nX
i=1
eit = Et (17)
The rst order conditions for emissions and output are identical to the socially
optimal equations (4) and (5). Moreover, this combined regulatory objective allows for
rmsindividually optimal choice of the external factor. It follows from inspection of
equations (7)-(9) and (17) that:
Remark 3 If a RPM is used to allocate permits based on a costly external factor then
a secondary (regulatory) target can be achieved whilst still achieving the socially optimal
outcome with respect to the target pollutant.
In other words, by allocating target pollutant permits among rms based on their
relative performance in a suitably chosen external factor, a regulator can kill two birds
with one stoneby achieving emission control at the lowest social cost in output and
permit markets, and maximizing aggregate production of a socially benecial external
factor.
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5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the impact and optimality of implementing a
generalised (dynamic) relative performance mechanism for the initial allocation of pol-
lution permits. We extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005) to accommodate
most of the existing dynamic initial allocation mechanisms, including grandfathering
and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms, such as rank-order contests. We show that
using rmshistorical outputs for allocating permits is never optimal, while using rms
historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class
of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocat-
ing permits based on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions.
We outline su¢ cient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism
and discuss the issues related to the choice of a suitable mechanism for initial allocation.
Due to these potential benets, we advocate using a relative performance mechanism
with an external factor for the dynamic allocation of permits. The numerous advan-
tages of using a relative performance mechanism include its adaptability to changing
economic, technological, and other conditions, as well as a possibility of transferring risk
of possible systemic shocks (such as oil price changes) to the regulator. The advantage
of using an external factor involves a possibility of achieving secondary regulatory goals,
such as revenue maximization, social betterment or reduction in other environmental
problems. Moreover, if the secondary goal is political agreeable, the permit trading
scheme may also enjoy greater public acceptance.
Allocating permits for a target pollutant based on rms relative performance in
external factor increases rmsexibility in meeting both regulatory goals by choosing
the most cost-e¤ective approach. That is, rms cost-e¤ective behaviour may depend
on whether it has comparative advantage in abatement of the target pollutant, or in
the production of the external factor. We think that such potential asymmetries among
rms are important for the optimal design of permit allocation schemes, a topic of
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potential future research.
We also propose a novel allocation mechanism involving a rank-order contest, which
is a generalization of an all-pay auction. In an external factor rank-order contest, rms
are ranked in the order of their relative production of the external factor, and it is
rms rank, and not the level of the external factor, that determines rms permit al-
location. As the theoretical literature suggests, an allocation scheme with a suitably
chosen prizestructure is expected to achieve the secondary goal of maximizing aggre-
gate production of the external factor - the goal which may not be achievable with other
allocation mechanisms. In other words, by allocating target pollutant permits among
rms using a rank-order contest in socially desirable activities (including abatement of
unregulated greenhouse gases or even charitable activities) a regulator can kill two
birds with one stoneby achieving emission control at the lowest social cost in output
and permit markets, and maximizing aggregate amount of a socially benecial activity.
The external factor rank-order contest has some advantages over the presently used
grandfathering scheme. While regulators seem to prefer grandfathering due to its po-
litical agreeability among the regulated rms, these schemes can be unpopular with
the general public. In contrast, an external factor contest not only has a potential
of achieving social optimality, but also it achieves a secondary regulatory goal (which
may be perceived as achieving fairness), while the grandfathering scheme involving
historical output and emissions achieves none of these two goals.
While we have presented arguments in favour of using RPMs based on an external
factor in allocating permits, we nevertheless appreciate the potential practical di¢ cul-
ties involving in the choice of a suitable external factor. The success of the trading
scheme rests on the regulators ability to nd an external factor that is desirable, po-
litically agreeable, independent from output and emissions, and allows for an adequate
comparison between rms. We nevertheless hope that the arguments presented in this
paper may be of relevance to the environmental policy makers.
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Notes
1We make a distinction between intensity-based caps and output-based allocation (although they
do both act as an implicit output subsidy). In intensity rate-based mechanisms the emission cap is
adjusted to maintain a constant emissions intensity and hence allocation is not dependent on other
rmsbehaviour (e.g. the levels of other rmsemissions and output choices). In contrast, output-
based mechanisms alter the average allocation per unit of output to maintain a xed emissions cap
(allocation is dependent on rmsbehaviour).
2See Fischer (2001) for static analysis of output-based permit allocations.
3Böhringer and Lange (2005) considered a number of historical observation periods, l = (1; 2 : : : ; s).
For expositional simplicity, we restrict our model to l = 1 (the historical period is simply the previous
period). It is straightforward to generalise our model to l > 1 historical observation periods.
4Instead, one can assume that hi and gi are negative.
5Our argument will not change if we relax the assumption of continuity to include relative perfor-
mance mechanisms such as winner-pay and all-pay auctions involving discontinuities in rmspayo¤
functions. To deal with such discontinuities, one typically assumes that all rms face commonly known
continuously di¤erentiable distribution of rmstypes, and that all rms follow symmetric strictly in-
creasing and di¤erentiable strategy, so that each rms expected payo¤ function becomes continuously
di¤erentiable.
6We follow the language of Böhringer and Lange (2005) and refer to the least-cost outcome and
corresponding conditions as socially optimal.
7Moreover, the longer historical period over which rms historical relative performance in output
and emissions is taken into account by the scheme designers, the more important is the e¤ect of each
current choice on future allocations. Because we assume that only one previous period a¤ects current
allocation, we do not explicitly address this point here.
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8Similarly, if either or both gi and hi are negative, there would be an incentive to decrease either
production or emissions or both to a suboptimal level.
9Note further that, as Mellers (1982, 1986) demonstrated, the allocations (of salaries and taxes)
judged to be fairby human subjects, depended on the rank of each recipients merit in the merit
distribution of the comparison group. In other words, a rank-based contest may be a good candidate
for a fairrelative performance mechanism.
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